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well-being. Much of the paper is concerned with the role of relative concepts. We find that 
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important in the racially divided South African society. It is also found that relative income is more 
important to happiness at higher levels of absolute income. Potential explanations of these results, 
and their implications, are considered. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Subjective well-being; happiness; comparator groups; altruism; envy; relative 
deprivation; standard-setting; race; South Africa. 
 
JEL classifications:  D60, D62, D63, D64, A12, I30  
 
 
Corresponding author: Geeta Kingdon, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor 
Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ.  Tel: 44-1865-271065.  Email: geeta.kingdon@economics.ox.ac.uk 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We are very grateful to Marcel Fafchamps, John Helliwell, Karla Hoff, Carol Graham, Alan 
Krueger, Valerie Møller, Frances Stewart, and two anonymous referees for perceptive comments.   
We are also grateful to participants at the CSAE Conference (Oxford), the NEUDC Conference 
(Montreal) and the DPRU Conference (Cape Town) for useful feedback.  Any errors are ours. 
 
* Title Page (with Full Author Details)
Page 1 of 32 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 1 
 
Community, Comparisons and Subjective Well-being in a Divided Society 
 
Geeta Gandhi Kingdon and John Knight 
University of Oxford 
 
 
July 2006 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Using South African data, the paper poses six questions about the determinants of subjective 
well-being. Much of the paper is concerned with the role of relative concepts. We find that 
comparator income, when measured as the average income of others in the local residential 
cluster, enters the household’s utility function positively (close neighbors are ‘positives’, not 
‘negatives’) but that the income of more distant others enters negatively. Race-based comparator 
groups are also important in racially divided South Africa.  Relative income is more important 
to happiness at higher levels of absolute income. Potential explanations and implications of 
these results are considered. 
 
 
 
Keywords:  Subjective well-being; happiness; comparator groups; altruism; envy; relative 
deprivation; standard-setting; race; South Africa. 
 
JEL classifications:  D60, D62, D63, D64, A12, I30  
 
 
Corresponding author: Geeta Gandhi Kingdon  
Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ,  U.K.  
Tel: 44-1865-271065. Fax: 44-1865-281447.  Email: geeta.kingdon@economics.ox.ac.uk 
 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We are very grateful to Marcel Fafchamps, John Helliwell, Karla Hoff, Carol Graham, Alan 
Krueger, Valerie Møller, Frances Stewart, and two anonymous referees for perceptive 
comments.   We are also grateful to participants at the CSAE Conference (Oxford), the NEUDC 
Conference (Montreal) and the DPRU Conference (Cape Town) for useful feedback.  Any errors 
are ours. 
Blinded Manuscript (NO Author Details)
Page 2 of 32 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 2 
1. Introduction  
In this paper we pose several questions about the determinants of subjective well-being. We do 
so for South Africa, a country that, because of its unusually divided society, provides a good 
case study of the effects of community and comparisons on subjective well-being. Each of these 
questions is new for South Africa. More broadly, the major contribution of the paper to the 
economic literature on subjective well-being concerns the role of comparisons made with others 
in the community. What are the reference groups against which people compare themselves, and 
do their comparisons give rise to fellow-feeling or to feelings of relative deprivation? We 
highlight the roles that space and race can play. Spatially defined reference groups are shown to 
have a positive effect on subjective well-being, suggesting that neighbors may be ‘positives’ and 
not ‘negatives’. By contrast, racially defined reference groups are shown to have a negative 
effect, implying that relative deprivation may be experienced in relation to others of one’s own 
race rather than to neighbors or to the larger society. There are interesting implications for 
welfare economics and for policy. 
 
In Section 2 we provide a framework of concepts and literature about the effects of comparisons 
on subjective well-being.. Section 3 describes the South African context and the data, and 
outlines the method: the estimation of subjective well-being functions that include explanatory 
variables representing relevant comparisons. The empirical Section 4 presents the results, 
question by question. In particular, we test whether and how spatial and racial comparisons 
affect subjective well-being.. Section 5 conclu es and draws out the implications of the analysis. 
 
2.  Concepts and literature 
The idea that relative position matters to individual utility has substantial support and 
acceptance in the social science literature, particularly in sociology (for instance, Runciman 
1966) and psychology (for instance, Diener and Biswas-Diener 2000). By contrast, mainstream 
microeconomic theory generally treats utility as a function of own absolute income.  However, 
some economists have advocated models in which the income of others enters the individual’s 
utility function (prominent among them being Duesenberry 1949, Easterlin 1974, 1995, 
Scitovsky 1976).  Frank (1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1990), Frank and Sunstein (2001) and 
Layard (2005a, 2005b) have argued that some well-established ideas about economic policy 
would be overturned if relative income were to matter.  
 
Page 3 of 32 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 3 
There is now also a good deal of empirical support for the notion that subjective well-being 
depends on relative income (Clark and Oswald 1996, Watson et. al. 1996, Tsou and Liu 2001, 
Luttmer 2005, van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004).  In some of the studies, utility depends 
more importantly, or even only (Groot and van den Brink 1999), on relative rather than on 
absolute income.  One study finds that pay satisfaction depends not only on relative income but 
also on ranked position within a comparison set (Brown et. al. 2003).  A study on Nepal finds 
that perceived consumption adequacy falls as ward (village) mean consumption expenditure 
rises (Fafchamps and Shilpi 2006). 
 
Analysis of this sort requires that the comparison set, the group with whom individuals compare 
themselves when judging their relative position, be specified.  Candidates for an individual’s 
reference group are the individual’s own past, her aspiration or desired future, others in her 
family, her spouse, others with similar characteristics, and others in her residential vicinity or 
workplace.  Since individuals have different identities in different contexts, they may also have 
more than one comparator group.  Various definitions of comparator group are found in the 
literature.  Many studies have used ‘others with similar characteristics’. For instance, an 
individual may match with others on the basis of educational level, occupation, gender, family 
background, race or region.   
 
What is the expected sign of the relationship between relative income (or other relative 
measures) and individual happiness? In general it is posited that subjective well-being varies 
inversely with the incomes of relevant others (for instance, Easterlin 1995, Falk and Knell 
2004).  In much of the applied literature that tests it, comparator income is indeed found to have 
a negative effect on the subject’s happiness level. The negative relationship is likely to arise 
from feelings of relative deprivation, which Runciman (p.11) defined as follows: 
A is relatively deprived of X if (i) he does not have X, (ii) he sees some person or persons, which may include 
himself at some previous or expected time, as having X, (iii) he wants X, and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he 
should have X. 
Karl Marx (1849, p.163) had developed a similar idea: 
Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which 
serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature. 
 
One reason for feelings of relative deprivation could be a sense of unfairness, or of envy, or of 
rivalry with others in the reference group. A more benign interpretation is also possible, for 
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instance that the reference group provides standards or goals to which the individual aspires. Yet 
another motive was suggested by Adam Smith (1776, p. 466) in the Wealth of Nations: 
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, but 
whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest order, to be without. 
In his view such customary goods were necessary for the avoidance of shame. Whatever the 
motive for feelings of relative deprivation (envy, aspirations or shame) we expect a negative 
effect of reference group income on own happiness. 
 
There are also reasons why the effect of comparator income can be positive. One such reason is 
altruism or fellow-feeling. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1759 , pp. 255-79) 
argued that it is in human nature to be altruistic towards other people, although there is an order 
in the exercise of human benevolence, from those we know well to those we know little. The 
view that people are altruistic is supported by the findings of an experimental game study by 
Charness and Grosskopf (2001, p. 302). Given that the subjects’ own payoffs are fixed, the 
authors find 
… a surprisingly low propensity to prefer lower payoffs [for others]: people generally choose to maximize the 
material payoffs to others, even when they are greater than their own.1  Similarly, Charness and Rabin 
(2002) use experimental games to argue that people feel positively about the income of others 
and that people are motivated by reciprocity. 
 
Risk-sharing within a community can provide another reason why own happiness is raised by 
other peoples’ income. Members of a community may provide each other with mutual social 
insurance (Ligon et al 2002). In developing countries, there is commonly an absence of formal 
insurance mechanisms.  This lack of formal instruments is particularly important in high 
unemployment economies and economies with high dependence on risky agriculture.  The 
literature on risk-sharing in developing country contexts attempts to identify the household’s 
insurance or risk-pooling group.  Since the cost of enforcement and monitoring of contracts 
increases with the size of and distance between members of the group, an obvious unit in which 
to observe insurance is the village or neighborhood.  Townsend (1994) finds for rural India that 
the village is indeed the relevant insurance group. However, Grimard (1997) uses 
anthropological literature on Cote d’Ivoire to suggest that the insurance group is not the village 
but a spatially diversified network of members of the same ethnic group. Bowles and Gintis 
                                                 
1 Participants were undergraduate students; they were not told the identity of their partners in the game. 
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(2004) develop a model in which ethnic, or ‘parochial’, networks cooperate not through altruism 
but through reciprocal benefits derived from the promotion of trust within the network. 
 
It is also possible that there is a positive relationship between own happiness and community 
social capital or education. Helliwell (2001), citing the psychological literature, has argued that 
social capital (defined as ‘networks, norms and understandings that facilitate cooperative 
activities’) can have a positive effect on subjective well-being. For instance, it is possible that 
social capital or education in a community creates positive externalities for its members, if  
well-being is raised by networking with people who have higher levels of community 
involvement or education. 
 
The composition of the reference group and ‘social distance’ may be closely related. In The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith (1759, p. 157) asked whether a person would be more 
disturbed by the loss of a hundred million lives in China or by the loss of his own little finger. 
He argued that sympathetic feelings would be aroused by the great loss of life in a faraway 
country but that those feelings would be attenuated by the physical and social distance. He 
suggested (1759, p. 270) that it is natural to care most about the ‘order and society’ to which one 
belongs. 
 
There is psychological evidence that people’s satisfaction depends on their social comparisons 
with others whom they perceive to be relevant comparators, and that these are people who have 
similar attributes (Goethals and Klein, 2000). This accords with the hypothesis that, the motive 
for social comparison being to evaluate one’s self-standing, the chosen comparators are people 
“close to one’s own ability or opinion” (Festinger, 1954, p.121). 
 
Akerlof (1997), in modelling social distance, argued that social interaction can influence 
individual decisions and aspirations and that social interaction is inversely related to social 
distance. Moreover, there is a large experimental game literature on social distance suggesting 
that people feel differently about those who are closer in some sense (see, for instance, Charness 
and Gneezy 2007, Charness et al. 2007, Cox and Deck 2005, and Hoffman et al. 1999). 
 
Social distance can also have an attenuating effect on a positive relationship arising from social 
insurance. People are more likely to share risks within a small community, where they can know 
and trust each other, than within a large community. The same is true of the argument made in 
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terms of social capital: own happiness is likely to be based on the extent of social interaction as 
well as on its quality. If the attenuation of a positive relationship with social distance is stronger 
than that of a countering negative relationship, it is possible for a net positive effect in a small 
community to give way to a net negative effect in a large community. 
 
Social distance can also diminish feelings of relative deprivation. Robert Roberts’ (1971) 
account of life in a Salford slum in Edwardian England illustrates how this can happen. The 
slum-dwellers, he claimed, did not make comparisons between themselves and people outside 
the slum: the strata of society were recognized without question and respect for their ‘betters’ 
and ‘superiors’ was firmly established.  But within the working class, comparisons were 
constantly made and social rating was of great importance. Despite desperate poverty, ‘envy was 
the besetting sin’, but only inside the slum (Roberts, pp.23-5). 
 
An obvious measure of social distance is physical distance. This suggests the need to investigate 
the role of relativities according to the size of locality, such as neighborhood, village, town, city, 
and region. The hypothesis is that the effect of locality income (whether positive or negative) 
diminishes as the size of the locality, and thus of the community, increases. 
 
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have argued that ‘identity’ (i.e. a person’s sense of self) affects 
individual behavior and aspirations. Race and ethnicity can provide a strong basis for identity, 
possibly because of their innateness and immutability. In a society with sharp racial divisions, 
aspirations may be related to what can be achieved by persons of one’s own race. If race 
identifies the reference group, race-based relativities may be important. However, that in itself 
does not indicate whether the income of the race group has a positive or negative effect on own 
happiness. It is possible that space and race interact, that the reference group is best defined by 
the race group within a small locality. 
 
 To the extent that happiness depends on the gratification of certain biological and physiological 
needs, it is not relative (Veenhoven, 1991).   By contrast, Pigou (1920) reasoned that since the 
rich derive much of their satisfaction from relative rather than absolute income, satisfaction 
would not be reduced if the incomes of all rich people were diminished at the same time.  In a 
similar vein, others have posited that in affluent societies, spending increasingly becomes a 
means to achieve social status rather than to meet economic needs (Veblen, 1899), or that 
perceived needs change with the general level of affluence of others (Schor, 1998).  Easterlin 
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(1995) argues that absolute income matters up to a certain level, after which relative income 
increasingly matters. 
 
Much of the economic literature on the importance of relative concepts treats people’s reference 
groups as given, yet they could be endogenously chosen by individuals in the pursuit of certain 
goals (Falk and Knell).  Nesse (2004) similarly rejects the notion that our ‘salient others’ are 
shaped by our culture and genes, suggesting that attention be paid to how individuals, in trying 
to satisfy particular psychological desires, create their own social groups. Feelings of relative 
deprivation can be reduced if people narrowly confine comparisons to others with whom they 
identify, perceived by race or class. There may be a conscious or unconscious tendency to do 
this when it is perceived that the disadvantage cannot be remedied. If a person is strongly 
motivated for self-improvement, she may make comparisons upwards, with others superior to 
herself.  On the other hand, where self-enhancement is important, she may select for comparison 
people who are inferior if that makes her feel better.  Such choices can induce acts of self-
selection into particular reference groups, for instance via migration or residential relocation 
(Stark and Taylor 1991). The endogeneity of comparator groups can be investigated only with 
information on individuals’ goals, either from attitude surveys or from revealed preferences such 
as migration to richer or poorer neighborhoods.  
 
 
3.    Context, data and method 
 
In South Africa race was the defining feature of society until the end of apartheid, with most 
aspects of life being governed by racial segregation.  For instance, different education 
departments catered for the education of the four races (African, Coloured, Indian, and White), 
and there was a marked racial hierarchy in resource allocations to schools.  There were 
restrictions on the movement and migration of non-Whites, and they had been debarred from 
entering certain higher positions of employment.  In such a racially divided society, race may be 
an even greater source of identity than it is elsewhere, and it is very likely that people’s 
aspirations are, or were, at the time of our  survey (just before the formal end of apartheid), 
linked to what they believed to be the range of states attainable for persons of their own race2.  
  
                                                 
2 See Møller (2002). 
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Our data come from the SALDRU national household survey of 1993 in South Africa carried 
out by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) of the University 
of Cape Town.  Patterned on the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Studies, the 
dataset contains information on about 8800 households, with modules on household 
demographics, employment, health, income and expenditure, and so on, as well as community 
information.   
 
The SALDRU survey was a household survey in which a sample of households, designed to be 
representative of the national population, were visited and interviewed by trained enumerators 
(SALDRU, 1994). Section 9 of the survey is on perceived quality of life. It contains, inter alia , 
the question: “Taking everything into account, how satisfied is this household with the way it 
lives these days?” The five options available in the pre-coded response are ‘very satisfied’, 
‘satisfied’, ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’, ‘dissatisfied’, and ‘very dissatisfied’. The 
proportion of households reporting these answers were 7.5, 26.4, 9.4, 33.4 and 23.4 percent 
respectively.  This question forms the basis of our empirical analysis. 
 
Whereas an individual member of the household responded to the survey question, the question 
itself related to the satisfaction of the household as a whole rather than to that individual’s 
personal well-being.   This raises the possibility that the individual answered mostly with his 
own personal satisfaction level in mind rather than that of the household as a whole.   In order to 
address this concern, we check the robustness of the findings to the inclusion of the individual 
respondent’s own personal characteristics as explanatory variables.  Appendix Table 1 shows 
that, controlling for household characteristics, individual characteristics are generally 
unimportant in our subjective well-being equations.  This is unsurprising not only because of the 
question posed but also because there are likely to be interdependencies in well-being among 
members of the household. 
 
The reference groups that we investigate are defined by race (four races are identified in the 
survey: African, Coloured, Indian and White) and space (enumeration cluster, district and 
province). The four races are distributed in the survey in the proportions 71% African, 8% 
Coloured, 3% Indian, and 18% White.   Unfortunately we do not have the information (on 
personal goals or on migration) to investigate the possible endogeneity of space-based reference 
groups. 360 clusters, 187 districts, and 9 provinces are included in the survey. The average size 
of their populations is 2,900, 125,400 and 4.46 million respectively, and the average number of 
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observations 25, 47, and 983 households respectively. Clusters, which play a prominent role in 
our analysis, were randomly selected units corresponding to a rural village or to all or part of an 
urban suburb. Race- and space-based reference groups are also combined. However, whereas it 
is possible to conduct an analysis of race within districts, there are too few observations in each 
cell to analyse race at the cluster level; in any case, most clusters are racially homogenous. 
 
We begin with the subjective well-being function: 
 iiii ZXW εγβα +++=       (1) 
where iW  represents reported well-being of the ith individual or household and X  is a vector of 
socio-economic variables and Z a vector of various relative concepts (such as relative income, 
employment and education).  Our measure of iW  is available as a multiple choice variable 
(effectively, “is your household 1. very dissatisfied;  2. dissatisfied;  3. so-so;  4. satisfied;  5. 
very satisfied?”).  Since there is an inherent ordering, the appropriate estimation procedure is by 
means of an ordered probit model. 
 
 
4.  Empirical results 
Table 1 sets out the notation, definitions, means and standard deviations of the variables used in 
the analysis. Column (a) of Table 2 presents a general specification of the ordered probit 
equation of subjective well-being, together with the marginal effects of the variables on the 
probability of being ‘satisfied’ or ‘very satisfied’ with life.  Column (b) provides an OLS 
equation of the same specification. Province dummies are included but not reported.  In this 
table and subsequent tables, the explanatory variables are divided up into ‘control variables’ and 
‘hypothesis variables’ (the variables required to test our six hypotheses).   
 
The ordered probit and OLS results are very similar: there are no differences at all in sign, and 
the significance levels are the same for each of the hypothesis variables.  This finding confirms 
that of Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) who examined the robustness of findings on the 
determinants of happiness using a household panel survey and found that their results were not 
sensitive to the choice between latent variable and OLS methods.   
 
In several respects, the equation is similar to that found in other studies (Helliwell 2002, Graham 
and Pettinato 2002, Di Tella et al. 2001, Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998): subjective well-
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being falls with age and then rises; is increasing in health, education and income; and falls with 
unemployment. Consider the size of these effects.  An increase in absolute household income 
(log of household per capita income, ln_hhpci) from one standard deviation below to one 
standard deviation above the mean raises the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with 
life by 11 percentage points.  Considering that overall probability of being satisfied or very 
satisfied is 33 per cent, this is not a dramatic increase for the large implied increase in income.  
The African probability of being satisfied or very satisfied is 21.5 percentage points lower than 
that of Whites, even after controlling for observed income, education, employment, and so on.  
Those who live in metropolitan cities (metropol) are 10 percentage points less likely to be in the 
highest two subjective well-being categories than are rural-dwellers (omitted category).  The 
household unemployment rate (hhurate) has a modest effect on the probability of being in the 
top two happiness categories. Going from one standard deviation below to one standard 
deviation above the household unemployment rate reduces that probability by 4.1 percentage 
points.  The effects of higher education (higher), health (hhdaysic), crime (n_victim), household 
assets (assetval), and debt (debt) are all as expected and statistically significant but small. 
 
4.1.  Space-based comparator groups 
Table 3 explores the role of space-based relative concepts in determining happiness. This is 
done by including, in the happiness equation, the average income, unemployment rate and years 
of education of households in the cluster, and in the district, calculated by averaging household 
characteristics within the cluster, and the district, but excluding each household’s contribution to 
the average. The full set of control variables, corresponding to the specification of Table 2 is 
included in all cases, but only relevant control variables and the hypothesis variables are 
presented in the table.   
 
The household’s absolute income (ln_hhpci) raises and the household unemployment rate 
(hhurate) depresses happiness significantly.  The first relative concept we consider is relative 
unemployment, defined as the unemployment rate of others in the cluster and then in the district.   
The cluster mean household unemployment rate (c_hhurate) reduces happiness significantly. 
Column (b) adds the district average of household unemployment rate (d_hhurate).  This has no 
relationship with household happiness, but the cluster unemployment variable continues to 
reduce household happiness significantly. The second relative concept considered is others’ 
education.  Columns (c) and (d) respectively add cluster and district averages of years of 
education. Cluster education (c_hhedyrs) enters positively and significantly and district 
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education (d_hhedyrs) negatively but insignificantly. The final relative concept considered is 
others’ income.  Column (e) adds cluster average income (c_lnhhpci).  This enters positively and 
significantly.  Column (f) adds district average income (d_lnhhpci), and this enters negatively 
but insignificantly.   
 
An interesting and consistent pattern thus emerges:  within the cluster, households derive 
happiness from others’ income success but within a wider area, the district, they may compete 
with others.  When all three dimensions (unemployment, education and income) are added 
together in column (g), the spatial education and unemployment rates no longer matter, 
conditional on income.  Only the income dimension is significant: the income of others within 
the cluster increases happiness, but income within the district weakly decreases happiness.   
 
These are fascinating results:  within the local cluster, other people’s income produces positive 
externalities on the household’s utility.  Only when the comparator group is widened to include 
more distant others (those in the district as a whole) does other people’s income appear to create 
negative spill-overs.   
 
The results have four possible explanations.  One is that households within a cluster share risks 
with each other (i.e. provide mutual insurance and support). The expectation of reciprocity 
causes people who live in a risky environment to value the income of their reference group. This 
is plausible when there is high unemployment and widespread lack of unemployment insurance, 
as in South Africa. To test this explanation we estimated the well-being equations separately for 
Africans and for Whites, since Africans have a higher unemployment rate (39% compared with 
5% for Whites) and much poorer access to formal insurance mechanisms. The estimates showed 
that the positive effect of mean cluster income on household well-being is the same for both 
races. The coefficient for Africans is 0.271 (t = 4.28) and for Whites 0.272 (t = 4.56). This result 
is inconsistent with the mutual insurance explanation. 
 
A second interpretation is that cluster income serves as a proxy for the ‘social wage’ (i.e. in 
better-off clusters, the level of public and other amenities such as education, health, sanitation, 
etc. is higher).  We conducted the following test of this hypothesis. We first removed all cluster-
level variables and introduced cluster dummy variables instead. The estimated cluster 
coefficients were then regressed on community amenities and cluster income together with a set 
of control variables: the results are shown in Table 4.  Six community variables are available in 
Page 12 of 32 
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 12 
the data set (whether roads become impassable, whether there are tarred roads, whether public 
transport is available, distance to the nearest source of public transport, number of community 
facilities, and distance to various facilities). However, none has a significant coefficient, nor are 
they jointly significant. By contrast, the coefficient on cluster income is positive and significant. 
We can find no evidence to support the social wage explanation. However, we cannot rule out 
the possibility that unobserved community facilities, if they are positively associated with 
cluster average income per capita, are driving the positive relationship between cluster income 
and subjective well-being 
 
There is a third, econometric, explanation: either that cluster mean household income and 
household income are positively collinear and cluster income is picking up some of the effect 
that is attributable to household income, or that household income is measured with error and 
cluster income is serving as a proxy for household income. We explored these possibilities by 
regressing household income (lnhhpci), and also cluster mean income (c_lnhhpci), on a full set 
of household-level explanatory variables. The high value of R-squared (0.558) in explaining the 
former suggests that household income is not subject to serious measurement error. Even if it 
were, the fact that the same set of explanatory variables can explain 56 % of the variation in 
household mean income but only 40 % of the variation in cluster mean income suggests that 
cluster income cannot serve as a good proxy for household income.  
 
The fourth possible explanation is that people are altruistic towards others in their own clusters, 
that is, clusters are treated like extended families, but people feel relatively deprived when the 
spatial orbit is widened to the district. It is pertinent to note that the cluster is a geographically 
small unit within which households are likely to know each other3. Pursuing this idea, whereas 
the average cluster contained 580 households, we divided households into two groups, those 
living in smaller clusters (containing no more than 200 households) and those in larger clusters 
(with more than 200 households). Compared to the coefficient on the cluster mean income 
variable for the sample as a whole (0.221, robust t = 5.1)4, the coefficient increases to 0.308 
                                                 
3 The documentation for the SALDRU survey states, “The sampling frame was drawn up on the basis of small, 
clearly demarcated area units [clusters], each with a population estimate… For most of the country census ESDs 
[Enumeration Sub-Districts] were used. Where some ESDs comprised relatively large populations as for instance in 
some black townships such as Soweto, aerial photographs were used to divide the area into blocks of approximately 
equal population size. In other instances, particularly in some of the former homelands, the area units were not 
ESDs but villages or village groups.” 
4 Column (e) of Table 3. 
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(robust t = 4.6) for households in small clusters and falls to 0.058 (robust t = 0.69) for those in 
large clusters. Thus, the relationship is powerful in small clusters and weak or absent in large 
clusters. These results provide support for the explanation in terms of altruism or fellow-feeling 
in a close community. 
 
The finding of positive externalities from others’ incomes is noteworthy in the light of studies 
that find a negative externality from the income of others in the locality. The size of the locality 
may be crucial. For instance, Luttmer found “neighbors” to be “negatives” in the United States 
but the “public use microdata areas” (PUMAs) that he used had an average of 150,000 
inhabitants and so were hardly neighbourhoods. Indeed the average PUMA is larger than the 
average South African district. There is no necessary inconsistency with our study. 
 
4.2.  Race-based comparator groups 
We turn to the role of racial concepts in determining happiness, particularly the hypothesis that 
the relevant comparator group for the household is other households of the same race (Table 5). 
Systematic racial segregation in apartheid South African society made it plausible that people’s 
aspirations were linked to what they believed to be the highest states attainable for persons of 
their own race.   We tested for race-relative effects in two ways: firstly, income relative to that 
of others of the same race within the district and, secondly, the same concept applied at the 
national level. 
 
The high correlation between household income and the relative position of the household in the 
national income distribution rules out the inclusion of both together in a subjective well-being 
function. However, this is not the case for race-based income distributions. For instance, a 
household with the average per capita income of the sample as a whole (Rand 671) would be in 
the fifth (i.e. top) quintile of its race-specific income distribution if it were African, the fourth 
quintile if it were Coloured, the third quintile if it were Indian, and the first (i.e. lowest) quintile 
if it were White.  
 
Column (a) of Table 5 repeats the best specification from Table 3 (includes space-based relative 
income measures).  Column (b) includes the natural log of race-specific district mean income 
(lrdm_inc).  This enters negatively and has a large coefficient, although it is only weakly 
significant.  It suggests that relative deprivation does play a part in the determination of 
happiness.  Controlling for household income, the higher the income of others of the same race 
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in the district, the lower is subjective well-being.  It is notable that the coefficient on the race-
specific mean income in the district, in column (b), has a bigger negative value than that on 
(overall) mean income in the district, in column (a).  In column (b), where both of these 
variables are included, only the race-specific variable is significant.  Column (c) accordingly 
drops the insignificant variable d_lnhhpci. In this column the marginal effect (not reported) of 
lrdm_inc on the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied is -0.2145.  Thus, if race-specific 
district mean income increases by one standard deviation (0.989) from its mean (5.946), the 
probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with life falls by a large 21.2 percentage points.  
 
Column (d) includes the household’s quintile position in the race-specific national distribution 
of income (r_pciq2  to r_pciq5), households in the poorest race-specific income quintile 
(r_pciq1) being the base category.  The household’s absolute income (ln_hhpci), although 
positive, is no longer statistically significant.  It cannot be argued that the household’s income 
quintile position simply proxies its absolute income because the same income places households 
of different races in very different race-specific income quintiles. For instance, a regression of  
ln_hhpci on the r_pciq2, r_pciq3, r_pciq4, and  r_pciq5  dummy variables yields an adjusted R-
squared of only 0.5475. The implication is that, for instance, a White household and an African 
household with the same income can differ in their subjective well-being because they belong to 
different race-specific income quintiles. 
 
 We perform a counterfactual calculation on the basis of the results in column (d). Consider an 
African and a white household possessing identical characteristics and income, both with the 
average characteristics and income of the sample as a whole. First, introduce the fact that the 
African household is in the highest race-specific income quintile and the white household is in 
the lowest. This creates a difference in the probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with 
life in favour of African household of 12.5 percentage points. Second, take into account the fact 
that the African dummy variable (the white dummy being the default category) has a large 
negative coefficient. This reduces the probability of the African household being satisfied or 
very satisfied by 23.4 percentage points. Thus, the disadvantage of being African greatly 
outweighs the advantage of being a relatively rich African.  
                                                 
5 In any case, we would expect the continuous variable (ln_hhpci) rather than the dummy variables r_pciq2 to 
_pciq5  to ‘pick up’ the effect of income because there is far more variation in the former than in the latter, but it 
does not.    However, we do not wish to conclude that absolute income does not matter to subjective well-being; in 
our other specifications, absolute income does matter significantly. 
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4.3   Interaction between absolute and relative income 
We ask whether the importance of relative income varies with absolute income. We do so by 
examining whether relative income affects subjective well-being differently among poor and 
non-poor households.  Households whose per capita income falls below the ‘household 
supplementary level’ poverty-line of Rand 251 per month in 1993 (a measure of what is required 
for basic subsistence are defined as ‘poor’ households and the rest as ‘non-poor’. We use the 
split-sample approach, which is equivalent to the conventional approach of interacting the 
poverty dummy variable with the regressors.     
 
Table 6 compares the determinants of happiness for the poor and non-poor.  A number of 
control variables are presented because they show some interesting contrasts.6  Poverty is more 
detrimental to the perceived well-being of elderly households than of younger households; those 
with a high proportion of persons aged 66 or over are significantly happier than those with a 
corresponding proportion of persons aged 36-45, but only if they are above the poverty line. By 
contrast, poverty does not matter to households with a high proportion of 16-25 year-olds, which 
are happier than those with a corresponding proportion of 36-45 year-olds irrespective of 
whether they are above or below the poverty line. Vicissitudes such as sickness (hhdaysic), 
crime (n_victim), and indebtedness (debt) matter more to the poor than they do to the non-poor.  
However, unemployment (hhurate) matters significantly more to the non-poor than to the poor.  
This apparently counter-intuitive result may be due to the fact that the poor mostly live in high 
unemployment areas where one’s own unemployment appears less blameworthy or more 
acceptable because a high proportion of acquaintances are also unemployed.  This explanation 
was tested by fitting happiness equations separately for low and high unemployment areas. It 
showed that unemployment depressed perceived well-being significantly only in lower than 
mean unemployment rate areas (the coefficient and robust t-value of hhurate in high and low 
unemployment areas were -0.097 (t = -1.5) and -0.399 (t = -4.0) respectively).7 
 
Our hypothesis is that absolute and relative income have different effects in the two sub-
samples. This is tested using race-specific district mean income as the relative income variable. 
                                                 
6 The apparent difference in the effect of race is spurious since there are virtually no Whites (only 0.6% of the poor) 
below the poverty line (i.e. in the base race category in the first column). 
7 Other studies also find that the unemployed suffer less in high unemp loyment areas (Clark, 2003; Powdthavee, 
2005). 
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The log of household per capita income (lnhhpci) is significantly positive for both poor and non-
poor but, whereas the coefficient on log of race-specific mean district income (lrdm_inc) is not 
significant for the poor, it is negative, significant and large for the non-poor. Absolute income 
matters for both groups8 whereas the variable representing relative deprivation reduces the well-
being of the non-poor but not of the poor.  
 
We conducted various checks on the robustness of this set of results. Experimentation with 
another poverty line (the ‘supplementary living level’, equal to Rand 220 per month in 1993) 
makes no difference to any of the patterns9. We also divided the sample into terciles and 
compared the lowest and the highest tercile. Again, in both specifications, absolute income 
mattered to the poorest third and relative income to the richest. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
Various tests of the robustness of the income results are reported in Table 7; these tests involve 
price deflation of income, collinearity of income with other variables, endogeneity of income, 
and errors in income measurement. Although spatially disaggregated consumer price levels are 
not available, it is possible to adjust income for differences in cluster food price indices, 
weighted for the importance of food in household expenditure. Column (a) shows an ordered 
probit with deflated income that is precisely comparable to the basic equation in Table 2.  The 
coefficient on the log of income (lnhhpci) falls only from 0.116 to 0.095.  Column (b) adds the 
cluster and district mean income variables to this specification. By comparison with the 
corresponding equation using undeflated income (column (f) of Table 3), the cluster mean 
income coefficient falls (from 0.265 to 0.175) but remains significantly negative. Columns (c) 
and (d) are OLS equations; the former corresponds to the specification in Table 2 except that it 
includes the spatial mean income variables whereas the latter omits from that equation those 
variables that are likely to be positively associated with household income. The effect of this 
omission is to raise somewhat the coefficients on both lnhhpci and c_lnhhpci.   
 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, using  panel data on happiness, show that the coefficient on 
income in their fixed effects model is lower than that in their cross-section OLS model, and they 
attribute this to time-invariant unobserved determinants of happiness biasing upward the cross-
                                                 
8 The coefficient is  actually greater for the non-poor than for the poor but the difference is not statistically 
significant. 
9 The poverty lines are obtained from May (1998). 
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section estimate. It is therefore worth testing for the possible endogeneity of our income 
variables. Using the column (d) specification, column (e) instruments the log of household per 
capita income (lnhhpci) with the log of household per capita consumption expenditure 
(lnhhpce). Expenditure seems to be a reasonable instrument for income since it is unlikely that 
measurement error in per capita income will be correlated with measurement error in per capita 
expenditure. The effect of instrumenting is to raise the coefficient on income from 0.120 to 
0.252, both highly significant. However, we would expect instrumenting to reduce the 
coefficient insofar as it corrects for endogeneity (i.e. eliminates the influence of unobserved 
factors that raise both income and happiness). Since, instead of lowering it, the instrumenting 
raises the coefficient on income, it seems to be correcting for measurement erro  in income.  The 
coefficient on cluster mean income in  column (e) is somewhat lower than in the uninstrumented 
case (column d); the coefficients on household income and on cluster mean household income 
are now on a par. 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
The first question that we posed was to what extent is it absolute income and to what extent 
relative income that determines happiness. We found  a good deal of evidence that both the 
income of the household and the income of other households influence subjective well-being. 
Some of our estimates suggest that the latter relative to the former is more important than the 
former on its own. Second, insofar as relative concepts matter, is it only relative income that 
counts or are comparisons made in other dimensions as well? The relative concepts that appear 
to have an effect are unemployment, education and income. However, unemployment and 
education are to some extent collinear with income. When all three are included, only income 
remains important. Third, if relative income matters, who are the relevant others with whom 
people compare themselves? We identified three types of reference group. Comparisons are 
made with the income of other households, the relevant others being based on space, on race, 
and on previous income.   
 
Fourth, and most importantly, does low income relative to others decrease or increase happiness 
(i.e. given own income, does the income of relevant others affect happiness negatively or 
positively)? We found that higher income of other households in a small community raises 
subjective well-being. This is a powerful new result. We considered four explanations: altruism, 
mutual insurance, a social wage, and non-causal association. Although suggestive rather than 
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conclusive, the results of our various tests were consistent with altruism or fellow-feeling, but 
inconsistent with the alternative explanations. This has interesting policy implications, such as 
for local taxation. It is not predictable whether our finding that close neighbors are positives 
applies also in other societies. The study for the United States that found neighbors to be 
negatives (Luttmer) used too broad a measure of neighborhood to be regarded as contradicting 
our result. Nevertheless, the peculiar nature of South African society (not only poor and unequal 
but also racially fractured) may help to produce unusually strong feelings of local solidarity10. 
 
In posing the fourth question we also examined race as the reference group. We found, in 
contrast to the spatial result, that higher income of households of the same race is associated 
with lower subjective well-being. This is consistent with perceptions of relative deprivation 
(aspirations ahead of achievements) possibly arising from standard setting or notions of 
unfairness, or envy. It appears that, whereas close spatial proximity (the same cluster) creates a 
sense of community, close social proximity (the same race) creates feelings of relative 
deprivation or sets goals and aspirations. 
 
Fifth, does the strength of the positive or negative relationship weaken as the reference group is 
broadened to include socially more distant people? Our evidence suggested that positive spill-
overs on subjective well-being at the local (cluster) level are diluted as orbits of comparison are 
expanded to include strangers. At the broader (district) level we found that spill-overs are 
negative. Similarly, perceptions of relative deprivation in relation to persons of the same race 
are evident not at the local level but at higher levels of geographical aggregation.  
 
Our sixth  inquiry was to discover whether the importance of relative income varies with 
absolute income. Indeed, the effect of relative income on happiness is strengthened as income 
rises. Whereas absolute income is an important determinant of the happiness of people whether 
they are below or above the poverty-line, relative income is not relevant to the poor. For those 
who are not poor, however, within-race relative income is important, suggesting that perceptions 
of relative deprivation play a role. 
 
The finding that South Africans confined themselves to comparisons with others of their own  
                                                 
10 A recent study, and the only other one to our knowledge, to find neighbors as positives is  also for a poor African 
country, namely Malawi (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2005). 
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race corresponds to the claim that English slum-dwellers a century ago confined themselves to 
comparisons within the slum (Roberts). It suggests that people choose their comparator groups 
by reference to social proximity, possibly to ease their states of mind or to protect self-esteem 
(in line with Festinger). South Africa in 1993 inherited a legacy of white privilege and black 
disadvantage. Africans would want to reduce hurt by avoiding comparisons with others whose 
achieved states were infeasible for them. Similarly, whites would want to assess themselves in 
relation to other whites, the community of which they felt part; comparisons with blacks would 
involve loss of face. 
 
Policy-making requires an understanding of reality, including the reality of people’s perceptions. 
Nevertheless, we are hesitant to draw policy conclusions from our results. One reason is the 
argument of Sen (1983, 1999, and elsewhere) eschewing the ‘metric of utilities’ in favour of the 
‘capabilities’ approach to addressing poverty; similarly, others regard the fulfilment of ‘basic 
needs’ as the appropriate objective. The underlying case against the utilities approach is that, by 
adjusting their aspirations to reality, people are conditioned to bear hardship. In the words of 
Sen (1999, p.358), 
Utilities can sometimes be very malleable in response to deprivation. 
The fact that people adjust themselves as well as possible to their condition does not diminish 
the case for redressing their condition. Nevertheless, Kingdon and Knight (2006) examine these 
issues and attempt to justify subjective well-being as a criterion for policy-making. Ultimately, a 
value judgement is needed. 
 
A second reason can be illustrated by the following case. Consider two households of equal 
income but of different race. One, being a poor member of a rich race, feels relatively deprived, 
whereas the other, being a rich member of a poor race, does not. Should policy favour the 
former? In the South African case we would disagree. We know from the estimates that a white 
household has a lower probability of being satisfied or very satisfied with life than an African 
household with equal income, on account of their different race-specific relative positions. 
However, the difference is more than offset by the negative coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing African race. This coefficient is likely to reflect the legacy of disadvantages, not all 
observable in the dataset, that black people suffered under apartheid. It may also represent 
African relative deprivation in response to the huge between-race income inequalities, which we 
were unable to capture in our estimates. The negative effect on subjective well-being of being 
African is best addressed by pro-African policies. 
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The apartheid policy of divide and rule accentuated racial differences. Our findings suggest that 
people did not feel themselves to be part of a common society. Such perceptions may have 
delayed political change in South Africa. Over the last decade, however, a culture of equal rights 
in a single society has blossomed, a black middle class has burgeoned, and some residential 
mixing has occurred. If this has widened orbits of comparison, it may have increased feelings of 
relative deprivation among Africans. It would be interesting to examine the determinants of 
subjective well-being in South Africa today to discover whether and how reference groups have 
changed.  If Africans now include whites in their reference group, this could be seen as a 
measure of social progress; the short run increase in dissatisfaction may be a cost that a divided 
society in transition has to bear, and it may provide the impetus for the transition to a more 
equitable society. 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Name Definition Mean s.d. 
Dependent variable   
qualife Perceived satisfaction with life: values from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest) 2.611 1.30 
Control variables   
impass community roads become impassable at certain times of the year=1 ; 0 otherwise 0.388 0.49 
pubtran community has public transport=1; 0 otherwise 0.731 0.44 
hhsizem household size 4.569 2.98 
hhnchild number of children below age 16 within the household 1.853 1.96 
migrate household migrated to its current area within the past 5 years=1; 0 otherwise 0.115 0.31 
higher proportion of household members with higher level education 0.075 0.22 
hhdaysic total number of person days that household members were sick in the past 14 days 3.008 6.38 
ironroof house has an iron roof=1; 0 otherwise 0.562 0.50 
racialm household is a racial minority in its cluster=1; 0 otherwise 0.103 0.30 
metropol household lives in metropolitan city=1; 0 otherwise 0.283 0.45 
urban1 household in urban non-metropolitan area=1; 0 otherwise 0.219 0.41 
rural household lives in rural area=1; 0 otherwise (omitted category) 0.498 0.50 
homeland household lives in a former ‘homeland’/Bantustan=1; 0 otherwise 0.434 0.50 
n_victim 
 
number of times in the past 12 months that household members have been victims of 
crime (robbery, assault, rape, murder, and abduction and ‘other’) 
0.115 
 
0.36 
 
ownship household lives in owned home=1; 0 otherwise 0.651 0.48 
debt household owes any debt=1; 0 otherwise 0.447 0.50 
nolfpb 
 
 
hhurate  – see below - is undefined (missing) for households with no labour force 
participants (lfp), so for these households, the included variable hhurate  takes value 0 and 
the indicator variable nolfpb takes the value 1.  nolfpb=0 for households with >=1 lfp  
0.155 
 
 
0.36 
 
 
age16-25 proportion of persons within the household aged 16-25  0.198 0.24 
age26-35 proportion of persons within the household aged 26-35 0.186 0.28 
age36-45 proportion of persons within the household aged 36-45 (omitted category) 0.129 0.23 
age46-55 proportion of persons within the household aged 46-55 0.083 0.19 
age56-65 proportion of persons within the household aged 56-65 0.059 0.17 
age>=66 proportion of persons within the household aged 66 and older 0.051 0.16 
 
Hypothesis variables 
  
african race dummy=1 if household is of African race, 0 otherwise 0.746 0.44 
coloured race dummy=1 if household is of Coloured race, 0 otherwise 0.077 0.27 
indian race dummy=1 if household is of Indian race, 0 otherwise 0.029 0.17 
white race dummy=1 if household is of White race, 0 otherwise (omitted category) 0.148 0.35 
hhurate 
 
household unemployment rate (i.e. proportion of household labour force participant 
members that are unemployed)   0.219 0.36 
lnhhcpi natural log of household per capita income 5.575 1.41 
assetval value of assets owned by the household, calculated as follows:  
assetval=(ncar*8)+(nphone*3)+(nkettle*0.5)+(nradio*0.2)+(nfridge*5)+(nbike*1) 
+(nestove*0.5)+(ngstove*1)+(ntv*3) +(ngeyser*2), where the preface ‘n’ before each 
variable means ‘number of’.  Thus, ncar is number of cars,  ntv means number of TVs, 
nestove is number of electric stoves and ngstove is number of gas stoves, and so on. 
9.561 
 
 
 
 
13.22 
 
 
 
 
c_hhurate* cluster average of household unemployment rate 0.219 0.16 
d_hhurate* district average of household unemployment rate 0.219 0.14 
c_hhedyrs* cluster average of household mean years of education 7.302 2.19 
d_hhedyrs* district average of household mean years of education 7.303 1.91 
c_lnhhpci* log of cluster average of household per capita income 5.963 1.01 
d_lnhhpci* log of district average of household per capita income 6.059 0.97 
lrdm_inc 
 
natural log of the race-specific district mean income (mean of household per capita 
income of all households of own race within the household’s district of residence) 5.945 0.99 
r_pciq1 
 
household is in the first quintile of its own race’s national distribution of income =1;  
0 otherwise (omitted category) 0.200 0.40 
r_pciq2 
household is in the second quintile of its own race’s national distribution of income 
yes=1 0.200 0.40 
r_pciq3 household is in the third quintile of its own race’s national distribution of income yes=1      0.200 0.40 
r_pciq4 household is in the fourth quintile of its own race’s national distribution of income yes=1 0.200 0.40 
r_pciq5 household is in the fifth quintile of its own race’s national distribution of income yes=1 0.200 0.40 
 
Note: * implies that the average was computed excluding the household’s contribution to the average. 
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Table 2 
Models of Perceived Life Satisfaction, Ordered probit and OLS 
 
 (a) 
Ordered Probit 
(b) 
OLS 
 Coefficient Robust t Marginal 
effect 
Coefficient Robust t 
Control variables        
impass -0.089 -1.3  -0.020 -0.102 -1.5  
pubtran 0.097 1.6  0.038 0.099 1.6  
hhsizem -0.019 -1.7 * -0.007 -0.020 -1.6  
hhnchild 0.049 2.9 *** 0.019 0.048 2.7 *** 
migrate 0.230 2.0 ** 0.076 0.252 2.0 ** 
higher 0.207 2.6 *** 0.078 0.218 2.7 *** 
hhdaysic -0.005 -2.2 ** -0.001 -0.005 -2.1 ** 
ironroof -0.137 -2.1 ** -0.042 -0.158 -2.2 ** 
racialm 0.242 2.4 *** 0.092 0.240 2.2 ** 
metropol -0.293 -2.8 *** -0.100 -0.306 -2.9 *** 
urban1 -0.251 -3.0 *** -0.086 -0.266 -3.1 *** 
n_victim -0.090 -2.3 ** -0.031 -0.103 -2.6 *** 
ownship 0.060 1.3  0.034 0.051 1.1  
debt -0.062 -1.5  -0.022 -0.063 -1.4  
nolfpb -0.059 -1.1  0.000 -0.071 -1.2  
age1625 0.343 3.8 *** 0.121 0.344 3.6 *** 
age2635 0.078 1.3  0.023 0.070 1.1  
age4655 0.041 0.5  0.012 0.048 0.6  
age5665 0.134 1.3  0.046 0.124 1.2  
age_66 0.273 2.5 *** 0.094 0.288 2.5 *** 
constant --- ---  --- 2.351 12.4 *** 
Hypothesis variables        
african -0.663 -6.1 *** -0.215 -0.778 -7.0 *** 
coloured -0.270 -2.3 ** -0.077 -0.272 -2.2 ** 
indian -0.219 -2.1 ** -0.071 -0.229 -2.2 ** 
hhurate -0.221 -4.4 *** -0.052 -0.250 -4.6 *** 
assetval 0.015 6.3 *** 0.005 0.015 6.2 *** 
lnhhpci 0.116 5.2 *** 0.039 0.116 5.3 *** 
Province dummies Yes yes 
Log L -11136.275 --- 
Restricted Log L -12199.69 --- 
Pseudo- 2R  or 2R  0.0872 0.2436 
N 8279 8279 
 
Notes: the column ‘Marginal effect’ shows the marginal effect of a variable on the probability of being ‘satisfied’ or ‘very 
satisfied’. In this, and other, tables, ***, **,  and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
The reported t-values use standard errors that have been corrected for clustering at the level of the enumeration cluster.  
Households lived in 357 clusters in this dataset. 
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Table 3 
The Effects of Space-based Comparator Groups on Subjective Well-being 
 
  (a)  (b)  (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) 
 Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t 
Hypothesis variables              
               
african -0.596 *** -0.595 *** -0.582 *** -0.580 *** -0.473 *** -0.467 *** -0.454 *** 
 (-5.2)  (-5.2)  (-5.2)  (-5.2)  (-4.2)  (-4.1)  (-3.8)  
coloured -0.227 * -0.227 * -0.199 * -0.199 * -0.087  -0.082  -0.072  
 (-1.9)  (-1.9)  (-1.7)  (-1.7)  (-0.8)  (-0.7)  (-0.6)  
indian -0.208 ** -0.204 ** -0.199 * -0.195 * -0.142  -0.132  -0.141  
 (-2.0)  (-2.0)  (-1.9)  (-1.9)  (-1.4)  (-1.3)  (-1.4)  
hhurate -0.189 *** -0.192 *** -0.224 *** -0.224 *** -0.199 *** -0.200 *** -0.199 *** 
 (-4.0)  (-4.0)  (-4.4)  (-4.4)  (-3.9)  (-3.9)  (-4.1)  
assetval 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.013 *** 
 (6.1)  (6.1)  (6.0)  (6.0)  (5.7)  (5.6)  (5.6)  
lnhhpci 0.113 *** 0.113 *** 0.105 *** 0.105 *** 0.090 *** 0.091 *** 0.090 *** 
 (5.1)  (5.0)  (4.7)  (4.7)  (4.2)  (4.2)  (4.1)  
               
               
c_hhurate -0.499 ** -0.602 **         0.094  
 (-2.0)  (-2.1)          (0.3)  
d_hhurate   0.168          -0.246  
   (0.4)          (-0.5)  
c_hhedyrs     0.052 *** 0.056 ***     0.005  
     (3.0)  (2.4)      (0.2)  
d_hhedyrs       -0.007      0.021  
       (-0.3)      (0.6)  
c_lnhhpci         0.221 *** 0.265 *** 0.273 *** 
         (5.1)  (4.7)  (3.3)  
d_lnhhpci           -0.070  -0.123  
           (-1.2)  (-1.4)  
        
Log L -11125.93 -11125.52 -11117.44 -11117.33 -11093.273 -11091.02 -11086.54 
Pseudo- 2R  0.0880 0.0880 0.0885 0.0885 0.0907 0.0909 0.0910 
 
Notes:  The variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All the control variables included in the parsimonious specification of Table 2 are included in each estimate. The addition of the 
hypothesis variables makes little difference to their coefficients. Therefore only the hypothesis variables are reported.  The number of observations in each case is 8,279, and the 
restricted log L = -12,199.69. 
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Table 4 
OLS Regression of Cluster Coefficients on Cluster and District Variables 
 
 Coeffic ient t-value 
 
Hypothesis variables 
   
pub_tran -0.0341 -0.40  
distrans -0.0038 -1.19  
numfaci 0.0018 0.48  
disfaci 0.0003 1.04  
impass -0.0679 -0.84  
tarroad 0.1150 1.13  
c_lnhhcpi 0.3401 6.61 *** 
    
Control variables    
wcape 0.6552 4.96 *** 
ncape 1.1453 4.60 *** 
ecape 0.4037 2.73 *** 
natal 0.6492 4.85 *** 
ofs 0.3693 2.18 ** 
etvl 0.6045 3.53 *** 
ntvl 0.5351 3.22 *** 
nw 0.1509 0.93  
homeland 0.1420 1.32  
metropol -0.2469 -1.88 * 
urban1 -0.1687 -1.67 * 
_cons -1.5506 -4.42 *** 
N 327 
Adjusted 2R  0.2568 
Mean of dependent variable 0.8235 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the coefficient on cluster dummies in the ordered probit equation of subjective well-
being in Table 2.  The cluster amenity variables are jointly insignificant [F = 0.73;  p-value of F test = 0.625].  Impass 
and pubtran were cluster amenity variables defined in Table 1.  The other cluster amenity variables are distrans = 
distance to nearest source of public transport; numfaci = number of community facilities available within the cluster; 
disfaci = total distance to various facilities from cluster; tarroad = whether the cluster roads are tarred.  ‘Facilities’ 
within the cluster were amenities such as bank, public telephone, market, health clinic, and post-office. 
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Table 5 
The Effects of Race-based Comparator Groups on Subjective Well-being 
 
  (a) (b)  (c) (d) 
 Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t 
             
african -0.467 -4.1 *** -0.617 -4.0 *** -0.616 -4.2 *** -0.710 -5.8 *** 
coloured -0.082 -0.7  -0.203 -1.5  -0.202 -1.5  -0.250 -2.0 ** 
indian -0.132 -1.3  -0.198 -1.7 * -0.197 -1.7 * -0.236 -2.2 ** 
hhurate -0.200 -3.9 *** -0.189 -3.7 *** -0.189 -3.7 *** -0.188 -3.7 *** 
assetval 0.014 5.6 *** 0.014 5.7 *** 0.014 5.7 *** 0.013 5.2 *** 
lnhhpci 0.091 4.2 *** 0.104 5.3 *** 0.104 5.3 *** 0.010 0.3  
             
c_lnhhpci 0.265 4.7 *** 0.296 5.2 *** 0.297 5.9 *** 0.260 4.6 *** 
d_lnhhpci -0.070 -1.2  0.003 0.0     -0.069 -1.2  
             
lrdm_inc    -0.170 -1.9 * -0.168 -2.1 **    
r_pciq2          0.105 2.2 ** 
r_pciq3          0.105 1.8 * 
r_pciq4          0.276 3.6 *** 
r_pciq5          0.319 2.8 *** 
     
Log L -11091.02 -11083.29 -11083.29 -11080.53 
Pseudo 2R  0.0909 0.0915 0.0915 0.0917 
 
Notes: as for Table 3.  Column (a) repeats column (f) of Table 3. 
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Table 6 
Subjective Well-being, by Poverty Status 
 
 Below poverty line Above poverty line 
 
 Coeff. Robust-t  Coeff. Robust-t  
 
Control variables 
     
age1625 0.267 2.2 ** 0.357 3.3 *** 
age2635 0.140 1.1  0.039 0.6  
age4655 -0.070 -0.4  0.057 0.7  
age5665 0.172 1.0  0.106 0.8  
age_66 0.125 0.6  0.357 2.5 *** 
hhdaysic -0.008 -2.9 *** -0.001 -0.2  
hhurate1 -0.121 -2.2 ** -0.309 -3.1 *** 
nolfpb 0.030 0.5  -0.045 -0.4  
       
assetval 0.018 4.6 *** 0.012 4.4 *** 
african -0.012 0.0  -0.802 -4.8 *** 
coloured 0.011 0.0  -0.280 -1.8 * 
indian -0.038 -0.1  -0.229 -1.8 * 
n_victim -0.188 -3.1 *** -0.042 -0.9  
ownship_ 0.126 2.0 ** 0.072 1.5  
debt -0.081 -2.0 ** -0.068 -1.3  
 
Hypothesis variables  
  
  
lnhhpci 0.091 3.6 *** 0.132 3.3 *** 
c_lnhhpci 0.164 2.0 ** 0.351 5.7 *** 
d_lnhhpci 0.014 0.2  0.092 1.2  
lrdm_inc 0.026 0.3  -0.385 -3.7 *** 
 
N 
 
4142 
 
4137 
Log L -5302.997 -5636.746 
Restr. LogL -5540.3536 -6238.7515 
Psuedo- 2R  0.0428 0.0965 
 
Note: The poverty line used is  the Household Supplementary Level, which was Rand 251 per month in 1993. The 
estimated equations are the parsimonious specification of Table 2 plus the measures of relative income. Only these 
measures plus the noteworthy control variables are r ported. Province dummies included but not reported.   
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Table 7 
Subjective Well-Being Equation, OLS and IV estimates 
 
 (a) Ordered probit with 
deflated income 
(b) Ordered probit with 
deflated income 
(c) 
OLS 
(d) 
OLS 
(e) 
IV 
 Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t Coeff. Robust-t 
Control variables           
impass -0.080 -1.2 -0.044 -0.7 -0.042 -0.6 -- -- -- -- 
pubtran 0.090 1.5 0.081 1.4 0.080 1.3 -- -- -- -- 
hhsizem -0.020 -1.7 -0.018 -1.6 -0.016 -1.3 -0.001 -0.1 0.001 0.1 
hhnchild 0.047 2.8 0.048 2.7 0.049 2.8 0.037 2.1 0.057 3.0 
migrate 0.225 1.9 0.214 1.8 0.237 1.8 0.234 1.7 0.229 1.6 
higher 0.229 2.8 0.223 2.8 0.196 2.5 0.292 3.6 0.200 2.2 
hhdaysic -0.005 -2.1 -0.005 -2.1 -0.005 -1.9 -0.005 -2.1 -0.005 -2.0 
ironroof -0.136 -2.0 -0.105 -1.6 -0.119 -1.7 -- -- -- -- 
racialm 0.253 2.5 0.237 2.6 0.208 2.2 0.166 2.0 0.162 1.8 
metropol -0.279 -2.6 -0.316 -2.2 -0.356 -3.0 -0.278 -2.4 -0.289 -2.4 
urban1 -0.234 -2.7 -0.260 -2.4 -0.300 -3.2 -0.254 -2.8 -0.268 -2.8 
n_victim -0.092 -2.3 -0.093 -2.4 -0.108 -2.7 -0.103 -2.6 -0.115 -2.8 
ownship 0.067 1.4 0.095 2.2 0.103 2.4 0.152 3.3 0.134 2.8 
debt -0.063 -1.5 -0.063 -1.5 -0.058 -1.3 -0.047 -1.0 -0.063 -1.4 
nolfpb -0.078 -1.4 -0.062 -1.1 -0.035 -0.6 -0.032 -0.5 0.065 1.0 
age1625 0.358 4.0 0.359 4.0 0.348 3.8 0.295 3.3 0.315 3.6 
age2635 0.078 1.3 0.066 1.1 0.054 0.9 0.000 0.0 -0.044 -0.7 
age4655 0.027 0.3 0.026 0.3 0.040 0.5 0.028 0.3 0.011 0.1 
age5665 0.171 1.6 0.180 1.7 0.125 1.2 0.102 0.9 0.059 0.5 
age_66 0.300 2.6 0.313 2.8 0.287 2.5 0.233 2.0 0.117 1.0 
Hypothesis variables           
african -0.686 -6.2 -0.549 -4.1 -0.561 -4.8 -0.803 -7.2 -0.721 -5.9 
coloured -0.284 -2.4 -0.168 -1.3 -0.068 -0.6 -0.165 -1.3 -0.114 -0.9 
indian -0.231 -2.2 -0.167 -1.6 -0.137 -1.3 -0.187 -1.9 -0.140 -1.4 
hhurate -0.244 -4.7 -0.235 -4.4 -0.226 -4.2 -0.236 -4.3 -0.101 -1.5 
assetval 0.016 6.3 0.015 5.8 0.014 5.5 -- -- -- -- 
lnhhpci 0.095 3.1 0.073 3.2 0.089 4.2 0.120 5.9 0.252 5.4 
c_lnhhpci -- -- 0.175 3.0 0.274 4.7 0.327 5.6 0.278 4.4 
d_lnhhpci -- -- -0.054 -0.7 -0.053 -0.9 -0.060 -1.0 -0.069 -1.1 
constant -- -- -- -- 0.913 2.3 0.635 1.4 0.135 0.3 
2R  / psuedo- 2R  0.0891 0.0891 0.2523 0.2437 0.2378 
N 8225 8225 8279 8279 8229 
      
 
Notes: Province dummies are included in all specifications.  Lnhhpci is instrumented with log of household per capita expenditure (lnhhpce) in the IV regressions.  In the first 
column, lnhhpci used is deflated by the cluster food price index. 
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Appendix Table 1 
The Determinants of the Household’s Subjective Well-being  
Including the Individual Respondent’s Personal Characteristics 
 
   Ordered probit 
equation from Table 2 
(a) 
Plus personal characteristics 
of the household respondent  
(b) 
  Coefficient Robust-t Coefficient Robust-t 
Control variables       
impass  -0.089 -1.3  -0.093 -1.4  
pubtran  0.097 1.6  0.099 1.6  
hhsizem  -0.019 -1.7 * -0.013 -1.1  
hhnchild  0.049 2.9 *** 0.040 2.4 *** 
migrate  0.230 2.0 ** 0.235 2.0 ** 
higher  0.207 2.6 *** 0.244 2.8 *** 
hhdaysic  -0.005 -2.2 ** -0.005 -2.1 ** 
ironroof  -0.137 -2.1 ** -0.131 -2.0 * 
racialm  0.242 2.4 *** 0.240 2.4 *** 
metropol  -0.293 -2.8 *** -0.299 -2.8 *** 
urban1  -0.251 -3.0 *** -0.252 -3.1 *** 
n_victim  -0.090 -2.3 ** -0.093 -2.4 ** 
ownship  0.060 1.3  0.063 1.4  
debt  -0.062 -1.5  -0.062 -1.5  
nolfpb  -0.059 -1.1  -0.038 -0.7  
age1625  0.343 3.8 *** 0.272 2.9 *** 
age2635  0.078 1.3  0.031 0.5  
age4655  0.041 0.5  0.087 1.1  
age5665  0.134 1.3  0.207 1.9 * 
age_66  0.273 2.5 *** 0.343 2.8 *** 
Hypothesis variables       
african  -0.663 -6.1 *** -0.657 -6.1 *** 
coloured  -0.270 -2.3 ** -0.254 -2.2 * 
indian  -0.219 -2.1 ** -0.206 -1.9 * 
hhurate  -0.221 -4.4 *** -0.210 -4.0 *** 
assetval  0.015 6.3 *** 0.016 6.5 *** 
lnhhpci  0.116 5.2 *** 0.120 5.3 *** 
        
Personal characteristics of respondent    
r_age     -0.010 -1.9 * 
r_agesq     0.000 1.3  
r_edyrs     -0.005 -0.4  
r_edyrsq     0.000 -0.1  
r_male     -0.010 -0.3  
r_empld     0.018 0.5  
    
Province dummies yes yes 
LogL  -11136.28  -11003.83 
Restr LogL  -12199.69 -12063.84 
Psuedo- 2R   0.0872 0.0879 
N  8279 8190 
 
Note: r_age and r_agesq  are respondent’s age and its  square; r_edyrs and r_edyrsq are respondent’s years of 
education and its  square; r_male is  gender and r_empld whether the respondent is employed or not.  
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